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Abstract
This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure con-
tracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trust-
worthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the
supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular,
we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments which may give rise
to undertrusting and overtrusting. The core of the paper sets out a
game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust per-
ceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both
on economic e¢ ciency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment
levels. We explore exible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid
contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation) and hy-
brid contracts. We then compare the e¢ ciency of the exible contracts
to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare im-
plications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current
issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts
in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory
institutions..
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate trust issues in infrastructure contracts, the viabil-
ity of such contracts and the role of regulation and institutions in general for
a¤ecting these contracts1 . More specically, we focus on how well aligned are
trust perceptions between buyers and sellers of infrastructure services, as well
as on absolute levels of trust. It turns out from our analysis, that both the de-
gree of mutual alignment/misalignment and the evolution of trust perceptions
between suppliers and purchasers are each of major importance. Infrastructure
investments install very long-lived, sunk assets and the services that they pro-
vide are typically highly politically sensitive (electricity, water, transport, etc.).
In consequence, the critical issue for e¤ective and sustained delivery is how to
ensure adequate trust between the supplying entity and the government. The
latter (or its proxy) purchases the output and provides the legal underpinnings,
including possible regulatory arrangements. These issues are always important
for private infrastructure investment, but are particularly important, rstly, for
riskier investments; and, secondly, for infrastructure investment in di¢ cult in-
stitutional environments as are frequently found in developing and transition
countries.
In practice, we observe a wide range of institutional arrangements to sup-
port private investment in infrastructure. This range includes, at one end of
the spectrum, licensed suppliers operating on innite length contracts super-
vised by a regulatory agency (where the term contractsincludes licences and
indenite infrastructure franchises). This is the electricity and telecom regu-
latory model. At the other end of the spectrum, are xed length concession
contracts with no external supervisory body other than the commercial courts
(as with many toll road contracts and many PPP contracts). There are also
many hybrid models which combine contracts with regulatory or other forms
of external regulation/arbitration etc. in various ways (e.g. UK railways, the
London Underground and many others). As argued later, contracts and regu-
lation are better regarded as complements rather than substitutes2 . It is worth
pointing out that infrastructure contracts  like long-term contracts between
companies - can be found with various degrees of external contract resolution
and with varying degrees of renegotiating exibility both in terms of tari¤ and
similar changes and for post-investment renegotiation3 .
In this paper, we explicitly introduce a measure for the quality of the in-
1 In particular we investigate the role of external agencies - regulatory agencies or similar
- can have in sustaining trust in infrastructure contracts. Contracts in our paper refer to
legally binding agreements that involve investment as well as operation and management.
These include all concession contracts with investment obligations, UK regulatory licences
and US innite duration franchises, but exclude French aftermage/lease and similar contracts
without investment obligations. They also exclude PPPs except for those where there is an
external regulatory entity in place (like the London Underground PPPs).
2See Stern (2003), Bolt (2003 and 2007). These both discuss the issues arising from the
perspective of a regulated industry. Athias and Saussier (2006) discuss these issues arising
from the perspective of concession contract design.
3See Athias and Saussier (2006) for evidence on this for toll road concessions and Menard
and Saussier (2002) for water supply arrangements.
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stitutional and regulatory conditions that prevail in the environment where the
contract is to be implemented. This is a variable that covers the aspects of
country governance that most directly impact on the likelihood that the con-
tract will be fairly administered and enforced and that any contract disputes
will be resolved in an impartial manner. Apart from the presence of a regula-
tory or quasi-regulatory entity, this most obviously concerns issues to do with
the rule of law, the reliability and timeliness of law courts, and levels of probity
(and corruption) in public life4 .
We present and report the results of a game theoretic model which includes
not just the contract and the relevant institutional framework, but also the
potential for renegotiation and contract modication (including regulatory re-
view). Hence, following Menard and Saussier (2002), we consider the relative
merits of di¤erent types of contractual arrangements. In addition, we explicitly
consider the role of pre-agreed revision and renegotiation clauses, following the
evidence of Athias and Saussier (2006) on the way that they are frequently used
in toll road concession contracts. Our model introduces trust alignment and
perception issues into this framework.
We adopt a game theoretic approach to these issues starting from a consid-
eration of alternative types of contract. We rst develop a typology of contracts
building on Athias and Saussier who distinguished between exible contracts,
which explicitly allow for contract renegotiations after investments have been
made; and rigid contracts, which set xed contract terms before the investments
are made and do not allow for subsequent term changes or renegotiation. We
then develop hybrid models which are constructed by introducing a variable for
the probability of renegotiating a xed contract after the investment has taken
place.
We integrate the discussion of contracts with that of regulation on the basis
that external regulators can allow simpler contracts, easier dispute resolution
and, in particular, more readily agreed contract renegotiation. This perspective
arises from La¤ont (2005), Guasch and Straub (2006) as well as Stern (2003).
The measure of trustworthiness on which we focus is the probability that the
contract between the buyer and the seller will be enforced, taking the simplest
dimension of enforcement, i.e. whether or not the buyer pays the rm in full
according to the terms of the contract. With trust misalignment, the perception
that the buyer will be paid in full can di¤er between buyers and sellers and each
can di¤er from the maximum level of one. We explore a range of contractual
and institutional arrangements that can reduce this perception gap and/or help
guarantee payment. These may take a variety of forms from (a) insurance
type arrangements (for example World Bank regulatory risk guarantees) to (b)
4Specialist regulatory or similar external agencies may be given some of the responsibilities
for these issues, but within a legal framework under which appeals and possibly implementa-
tion would be done by the local courts. Of course, countries may decide to establish indepen-
dent regulatory or similar agencies as a way of signalling to investors their commitment to
fair dealing on infrastructure contracts and investment. Such policy signalling devices were
advocated by the World Bank and others in the 1990s but actually go back to medieval times
for trade courts, as shown in Greif (2006).
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some form of explicit pre-payment contracts (see, for instance, Braynov and
Sandholm, 2002). Essentially in our model, the term prepaymentis interpreted
broadly and can mean any facility that provides an almost as good as in your
pocket moneyto the buyer and/or the seller.
The paper sets out the formal modeling relationship between trust percep-
tions and di¤erent contractual arrangements. We do this by constructing a
bargaining model between the buyer and the seller using a framework based on
Nash bargaining, where the dynamic responses are generated by Bayesian updat-
ing. We compare the expected welfare and the expected investment levels from
each of our contractual types with those from a benchmark incentive-compatible
contract, and we use these expected welfare and investment comparisons to eval-
uate the appropriateness in di¤erent circumstances of di¤erent contract forms.
These provide a framework within which we can evaluate the importance of
external regulatory and of pre-payment/guarantee arrangements.
In section 2 we address the question of whether concession contracts are
substitutes or complements and we introduce the key concepts used in our mod-
elling. This is followed by section 3 where we set out the formal framework of
our model. We consider the relative merits of alternative forms of exible con-
tracts and rigid contracts in addressing the problems posed by variations in the
perceived levels both of trust misalignment and of the absolute values of these
trust perceptions. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section 4. We include as
appendices (a) a discussion of relevant cases on OECD and developing countries
and (b) a mathematical appendix.
2 CONCESSIONCONTRACTSREGULATION
AND TRUST CONCEPTS
In this section, we rstly provide a summary literature review of the relationship
between contracts and external regulatory entities and then we introduce the
key concepts used in our model.
2.1 Infrastructure Contracts and External Regulation
From around the mid-1980s, there was a strong push towards developing regu-
latory agencies as the key way in which trust could be established for countries
privatising their utilities or wishing to expand private investment. Hence, it was
suggested that establishing such agencies was a way of assuring infrastructure
investors that countries were now trustworthy.
Proponents of this view failed to give su¢ cient weight to:
(i) the degree to which governments would intervene into regulatory deci-
sions;
(ii) the degree to which regulatory laws and institutions provided discre-
tionary powers (which enabled governments to intervene arbitrarily); and
(iii) the time it takes to establish regulators and the volume of specialist
resources required.
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In consequence, by the late 1990s, the optimistic view of regulators was
seriously battered by major regulatory failures, in particular after the Asian and
Latin American nancial crises in 1997-98 when new regulators were e¤ectively
discarded and many investments (or at least debt contracts for the investments)
became unviable.
A counter view was that regulators - or at least regulatory discretion - was
the main problem. For instance, Spiller (2004) argues that concession contracts
provide individualized regulation with contracts that are rigid by origin rather
than relationalas typically found in long-term contracts between private sector
entities. This is supposed to resolve the problem of regulatory discretion. The
problem with this argument is that, as is now well-known, tight contracts are
very brittle in the face of shocks and renegotiation can be di¢ cult.5 Renegotia-
tion rates are typically very high for developing country concession contracts -
particularly for toll road and water concessions which Guasch (2004) reports at
(respectively) 55% and 74% for Latin America over the period 1989-2000. How-
ever, this probability was reduced by between 20-40% if there was a pre-existing
regulator in place. (Guasch, p. 90.)
Stern (2005) sets out the counter-argument to the case for rigid contracts
without external regulatory support. This counter-argument is that, where
country governance is su¢ ciently supportive, trust is better achieved for in-
frastructure investment by establishing a separate external regulatory or quasi-
regulatory entity, which has been assigned legal powers to act of its own vo-
lition. This agency should have the authority, in consultation with regulated
companies and their consumers, to modify existing regulatory obligations (for
example, tari¤s and quality of service) and to establish new regulatory rights
and obligations. In particular, it should have the right to review and revise
regulatory obligations according to some dened process. Hence, it operates
as a full regulator, including a degree of bounded and accountable discretion.
The relevant range of agencies that this encompasses includes classic regulatory
agencies, autonomous concession contract monitoring agencies, strong arbitra-
tion agencies and external review as well as specialist courts with powers to
review and modify contracts (like the French Conseil dEtat in the case of water
concession contracts.)
Such a mechanism provides a way in which contracts can be reappraised and
revised in the light of changing circumstances according to a pre-agreed and im-
partial process. Hence it allows simpler and more transparent initial contracts
and better enforcement. In many cases contracts without external regulatory
support will at best require major renegotiation and in many cases will fail.
However, there are also cases where contracts with little or no regulatory sup-
port may well be su¢ cient. The di¤erence depends rstly on the nature of the
contracted service and its associated investment (e.g. whether it is a straight-
5Of course, far from all renegotiations lead to project collapse. Nevertheless, according
to the World Bank PPI database, over the period 1990-2004, 160 infrastructure projects
accounting for 9% of investment ows were cancelled or in distress. For water, 7% of projects
accounting for 37% of investment ows in the sector were cancelled or became distressed, i.e.
a disproportionate number of high value concession projects.
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forward and/or previously successfully delivered investment); and, secondly, on
the degree of trust between the purchaser and the seller and/or on whether the
parties do or do not have a previous history of successfully managing such con-
tracts. We discuss this further in the next section and again with examples in
the appendix (section 6) following the results from our bargaining model.
2.2 Trust Misalignment: Undertrusting and Overtrusting
In this paper we introduce the concepts of undertrustingand overtrusting.
These are the key concepts for our model and they can be understood as follows:
Consider the typical case where the government is the buyer of infrastructure
services via some type of long duration contract or equivalent6 and the seller
is a private company, typically an infrastructure company. We dene "under-
trusting" as the case where the selling rms belief that the buyer will honour
the contract in full is less than the buyer himself perceives it to be. Similarly
we dene as "overtrusting" the case where sellers estimate that it will receive
full payment under the contract is greater than the buyer believes it to be.
With undertrusting, the key problem is how to motivate and sustain ongoing
and agreed levels of investment in the face of unforeseen developments and
incomplete contracts. Undertrusting typically arises when the reputation of
the buyer is either not established (as with a major new type of infrastructure
contract or a contract in a new and potentially di¢ cult or uncertain area or
country); or where the reputation of the buyer is impaired (e.g. from past bad
history of government treatment of private and/or foreign investors or political
instability).
Conversely with overtrusting, the key problem is whether or not companies,
having made particular investments, will receive payments that they think they
are owed under the contract when unanticipated changes are needed and/or un-
foreseen developments occur. Hence, whereas one would expect contracts with
undertrusting to break down relatively slowly, contracts with overtrusting are
likely to collapse rapidly once the seller has recognised its presence. Overtrust-
ing typically arises when investors have too optimistic a view of the degree to
which governments (particularly future governments) are both willing and able
to commit to commercialized provision of infrastructure.7
Trust alignment occurs when the beliefs of the seller and buyer are the same.
Of course, this may be at a high level of trust (as in countries in the top 5%
of country governance scores) or at a very low level of trust (as in countries
with very low country governance scores). In what follows, we show that, the
best outcome particularly for consumers involves contracts with high levels
of mutual trust. However, we also show that infrastructure contracts involving
6A xed period UK-style infrastructure regulatory licence and an innite US utility autho-
risation would both be included in this categorisation.
7For developing and transition countries, this includes a sustainable commitment to macro-
economic and exchange rate stability that would allow foreign investors to pay debts and
repatriate prots in the appropriate currency.
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quite large amounts of privately nanced investment may be sustainable in
circumstances of low trust even if they are highly suboptimal.8
Similar trust and trust perception issues exist over the commitment of the
seller (i.e. the infrastructure company). We do not explicitly discuss such issues
in what follows but the analysis should be similar, albeit this time referring to
the probability of investment rather than the probability of full payment. We
leave this for future research - as well as combining buyer and seller trust and
trust perception issues.
3 THE MODEL
The model draws on game-theoretic bargaining models that have been devel-
oped in related contexts. In particular, we draw attention to McMillan and
Waxman (2007) which explores the importance of trust in terms of the way it
inuences the bargaining power of governments and multi-national companies.
We also draw attention to the paper by Braynov and Sandholm (2002) which
has a technical discussion of how trust can be integrated and handled within
di¤erent types of Nash bargaining solution modelling environments. The gen-
eral issue of government and company reputation in infrastructure concession
contracts is discussed in Guasch and Straub (2006) paper on concession contract
renegotiation both with and without the presence of a pre-existing regulatory
agency.
Weakness in contract enforcement is one of the main reasons why developing
countries generally nd it more di¢ cult to attract both international trade as
well as infrastructure investment. The dynamic process by which rms engaged
in international trade build trustworthiness because contracts are not completely
enforceable, is discussed in Araujo and Ornelas (2007), a paper focusing on short
term international trade contracts. Braynov and Sandholm discuss contracting
with uncertain levels of trust in a static model and the importance of the extent
to which the sellers trust equals the buyers actual trustworthiness. We do
combine both of these characteristics in this paper.
In what follows, we discuss uncertain levels of trust in infrastructure con-
tracts but extend the analysis to cover dynamic as well as static aspects of
contract sustainability and the role of external regulatory or quasi-regulatory
agencies.
The institutional environment
We dene an institutional parameter  2 [0; 1] that measures the countrys
ability to enforce concession contracts. Perhaps the simplest interpretation of
 is that it is a simple indicator of the proportion of contracts enforced by
the legal system in any country, as suggested by Anderson and Young (2006).
Alternatively it can be considered as an indicator of the probability that contract
violations will be detected and punished, as well as whether or not there are
8For instance, Paraguay in the 1960s and 70s and some central African states.
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e¤ective adjudicating procedures for disputes. Either of these would imply the
importance in determining  using country global governance indicators, like
the World Bank Kaufmann et al. indices.
For long-term infrastructure contracts with sunk costs, the value of  is also
signicantly likely to be a¤ected by whether or not there is some type of external
regulatory or quasi regulatory agency in place.9 The existence and e¢ ciency
of any such entity along with general country governance quality will largely
determine how close  is to one.
However, we would also include other parameters in the buyer countrys
socio-economic environment that are likely to a¤ect its observable ability and
willingness to meet long-term contractual commitments. These would include
the degree of international indebtedness of the country concerned, the degree of
political polarization and stability, etc.
Trustworthiness beliefs held by the rm
The situations that we model incorporate (a) imperfect contract enforce-
ment, (b) potential opportunistic behaviour by the host government and (c)
the presence of very large sunk costs (as typically found in the majority of in-
frastructure contracts). This means that following Williamson (1976), we would
expect substantial transaction costs to be present. These factors may prevent
such contracts from being concluded, or from being carried out for their full
term. Conversely, the more that the government abides by the terms of a con-
tract the more convinced the investing rm can become in the trustworthiness
of the purchasing government.
We denote as a0 the selling rms belief that the government will honour
the terms of the contract and that it will be paid on delivering the product or
service of the contract on the terms stipulated in the contract. There is little
theoretical analysis of the dynamic process by which trustworthiness is built as
a response to the lack of perfect enforceability of contracts. However there is
abundant anecdotal evidence of how trust can be used to compensate for the
lack of formal legal agreements or other relevant features of the institutional
set up abound. Grief (1993) analyses the formation of coalitions by medieval
merchants to compensate for limited contract enforceability, while McMillan
and Woodru¤ (1999) show how relationships based on trust arise and develop
in environments where there is virtually no contract enforcement as is the case
of Vietnam. Macaulay (1963), argued that a key virtue of relational contracting
is that parties can count on each other to abide by the spirit of the contract and
therefore do not waste much time and e¤ort in specifying its letter.
We assume that the rm updates is beliefs about the purchasers type ac-
cording to Bayes rule:
9As discussed above, this includes autonomous concession contract monitoring agencies,
external arbitration, expert panels etc., as well as classic infrastructure regulatory commis-
sions/o¢ ces.
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a0(fpaidg; a0) = pr(m j fthe government pays the sellerg\a0) = a
0
a0 + (1  a0) > a
0
As a result of the Bayesian process above, the adjustment in a0 is upwards
unless there is bad news in which case there will be a reversion to the initial value
(as we fully explain below). Note that the rm may get paid even if the current
government (purchaser) is not trustworthy - in other words it may have an
incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviour but is discouraged or prevented
from doing so by the institutional environment which successfully enforces the
contract. Hence both the parameter for the institutional environment ; as well
as a0; the reputation (i.e. the perceived trustworthiness) of the government of
the day, play a positive role in forming the subjective probability (as perceived
by the seller) of full payment by the purchaser. This is discussed in the next
subsection.
Araujo and Ornelas discuss a series of one-period trading contracts. In their
model the outcome of each contract feeds into the reputation of the buyer with
whom a long term relationship is established via a trust enhancing (or diminish-
ing) e¤ect of successive contracts. We instead wish to apply this approach into a
typically long term infrastructure contract where trustworthiness tends to grow
incrementally over time. However, there is no doubt that a history of previously
successfully concession contracts in a country has a positive externality e¤ect
on future concession contracts by increasing the prior estimate by the seller (in-
vestor) of the buyers trustworthiness. The strength of this externality will of
course depend on whether this buyer is the same or a di¤erent government. We
also discuss this in the next subsection.
The rm has an initial prior estimate (belief) a0 > 0 and we allow this to
increase up to a maximum of 1 during the length of the contract. In other
words, we dene a history according to which the rm updates its estimate
regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer during the life of the contract as and
when further information regarding the government becomes available. Then we
label as a0k (C; a
0), the value of the estimate made by the seller of the probability
that the purchaser is trustworthy after k periods (dened in years, or months,
or even days as appropriate) given a starting date  for the concession contract,
during which experience is cumulated applying a cardinality C, where C =
+k 1X
j=
hj , hj 2 f0; 1g. Hence through the life of the contract (which, for an
infrastructure contract, will typically tend to run in double digit years) the
estimate of the trustworthiness of the trading partner will be updated. Events
(news) if non existent or positive are indicated by hj = 1 (i.e. no news is good
news10), while negative news is indicated by hj = 1  j . Under this mechanism
10Tirole (2008) argues that "parties to a contract tend to specialize in identifying bad news
for themselves/good news for the other party". However in our model, the buyer faces no
participation constraints as it is the seller who pays for the investment. Hence it is in the
sellers interest to unveil both bad as well as good news that may a¤ect his expected prot.
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information regarding the trustworthiness of the government by the rm will be
cumulated over time. The estimate by the rm at time +k of the governments
trustworthiness on a contract that started at time  is given by the following
Bayesian updating process:
a0k (C; a
0
 ) =
a0
a0 + 
C(1  a0 )
(1)
Clearly if there is a bad event, C = 0, and trustworthiness will revert in the
next period back to its prior value of a0 from where it will start increasing once
more. In the absence of bad events C will increase and a0k will increase towards
its upper maximum value of 1. Hence a0k 2 [a0 ; 1]
The justication for this uneven treatment is that humans perceive trust
destroying events as more noticeable than trust building events; hence the former
tend to carry more weight than the latter. Once trust is lost it is costly to rebuild
and it will take both time and a series of positive events for it to be regained.
Note that the institutional environment plays a direct role as well as an indirect
one since, if the institutional factors will ensure that payment occurs in any case,
contract commitments will be enforced even if the government is untrustworthy.
However in our model enforcement is separated from trust as the latter can
compensate for the absence of the former (Greif, 1993), although, in general, it
is to be expected that trustworthiness should act as a complement to the quality
of the institutional environment as discussed in the previous section.
Updating delays and the importance of prior beliefs
The subjective probability held by the rm that it will receive payment is
a = a0 + (1   a0). If the institutional setting of the country improves, then
the rm will expect to receive its payment with a higher probability and a0
will become less important in determining the probability of payment. If a0 is
updated upwards, then the institutional parameter becomes increasingly less
important in determining the belief regarding the probability of payment.
Note that a purchasers reputation at time  is not a¤ected by the increase
in  at that time (denoted by  ). This is because a is a function of the events
that have occurred so far during the contract only up to the start of the cur-
rent period. However, current period events will a¤ect the purchasers future
reputation at time  + 1 onwards. This means that an improvement in  can
potentially slow down the updating process regarding the perceived trustwor-
thiness of the trading partner. This is because it makes it more di¢ cult for
the rm to determine whether the government is complying with the terms of
the contract voluntarily or whether it is doing so because of the institutional
restrictions (including the threat of a legal or regulatory challenge, or the com-
mencing of external arbitration, etc.). Hence if a change in  occurs at time  ,
then after k (for k > 0) periods:
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@a0k
@
=
 CC 1a0 (1  a0 )
a0 + 
C(1  a0 )
2 < 0 (2)
And the impact on the overall probability of payment is
dak
d
=
@(ak + (1  a0k ))
@
= (1  a0k ) + (1  )
@a0k
@
(3)
dak
d
will be positive provided that:

1  

1 +
1  a0
a0
C

> C (4)
The left hand side in the above is an increasing function of : This implies
that in countries with an already strong enforcement environment (UK, France,
etc.), (4) will hold. A further increase in  will lead to a direct increase in the
probability of payment as estimated by the seller. However, in a country with a
low ; the rms beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of its trading partner are
very sensitive to changes in the quality of institutional enforcement environment.
Hence a small improvement in the enforcement will delay the establishment of
a reputation for the buying government by delaying a0k climbing upwards away
from the prior belief. Hence there are increasing returns to the institutional
quality (Araujo and Ornelas, p. 20) in terms of updating the perception of the
probability of payment.
Successful rescues of endangered contracts (like the externally mediated res-
cue of the Cambodian airport concession described in de Brux, 200811) can
result in the substantial increase in the prior belief a0 ; that will be the starting
point in a future contract. Hence there is an important cross contract external-
ity in that the history of a previously successful contracts will confer signicant
benets on subsequent contracts in terms of increasing the starting value of a0 ,
thus making further updates desirable, but less crucial than before. If this is
combined with a subsequent increase in  it will lead to a substantial upward
revision in the probability of payment ak :
The discussion above illuminates the discussion in section 2. It is clearly
ideal to have a combination of a high  with a high a0 so that each comple-
ments the other for any given contract. However, it also helps to explain why
within the historical context of each country, the establishment of high personal
trustworthiness by a government usually precedes the development of strong
11De Brux and others provide evidence that successful renegotiation can be welfare enhanc-
ing, rather than welfare reducing as typically perceived in the standard bargaining theory. See
de Brux (2008) for a full set of references and a discussion of welfare improving renegotiations
- usually achieved via the involvement of an external entity to the contracting parties.
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commercial courts and regulatory or quasi-regulatory institutions, rather that
the other way round. Initially, for low trust countries, it takes a genuinely re-
forming and committed government to want to establish trustworthiness and
be willing to breakwith the past to do so. Then this will be followed by the
establishment of legal and regulatory institutions by that government or a sim-
ilarly minded successor. Such actions will strengthen enforcement institutions
(i.e. increase ) and as positive experiences with these institutions accumulates,
it will make the success of future contracts less government specic. In partic-
ular, it raises the costs for future governments of reneging on contracts or on
weakening established supporting institutions. This point is discussed further
below.
The buying governments type
The governments own assessment of its trustworthiness is dened as a ran-
dom variable b. This variable represents the probability of the favourable event
" = fthe government pays the sellerg occurring, which, in turn, depends rstly
on the degree of commitment by the government to honour the contract and,
secondly, on the level of contract enforcement in that country. Following My-
erson (1979), the level of commitment by the government is assumed to be a
variable state of nature, which is dened broadly enough to include all subjective
unknowns which might inuence it.
A country where a government has entered into arrangements with private
(particularly foreign) investors either without total commitment or where polit-
ical and/or economic polarization means that future governments may renege
on the commitment12 , is mostly likely to have a b markedly less than 1. Ei-
ther of these introduces major uncertainties concerning the performance of the
contract in the future. Governments may go down this road because of insuf-
cient tax revenue to fund preferred public sector options, because of political
and economic pressure from a higher level of government, or as a condition
for international lending or aid assistance. Other possibilities are where po-
litical opposition to private investment in infrastructure increases over time so
that the political costs to the government of maintaining the private investment
contracts gradually increase, or where there are federal-state level conicts and
where there are known but under-stated domestic and/or international debt and
exchange rate risks. All of these are likely to be associated with a low value of
b.
We would normally expect that government commitment to an infrastructure
contract would be a¤ected by the level of enforcement at time  ,  , since a
government would be unlikely to enter a contract with a low probability of
paying if it knew that it is very likely that it would be forced to pay the contract
by the mechanisms in place. Hence we would expect b to be an increasing
function of :
12Examples include Venezuela pre and post the Chavez presidency and the Chad govern-
ments actions to suspend the Future Generations Fund to collect earmarked savings from oil
sales.
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From the arguments above, governments can have a strong incentive to in-
ate the true actual value of b: But even if the government truthfully reveals
this value - and we shall assume initially that this is the case - clearly a and b
can di¤er even when they are both common knowledge.
Disagreement on mutual beliefs can occur among rational agents if the agents
have di¤erent priors (Aumann 1976) and they follow a di¤erent process of up-
dating or forming such beliefs. The main case in the analysis that follows is
the undertrusting case where a < b and b is a fair representation of the govern-
mentss expectation that it will meet its obligations under the contract, while
overtrusting is also mentioned as a case where either from the outset, or more
likely as a result of updating during the life of the contract, a is larger than b:
Types of contracts
Much of our attention in subsequent sections is on hybrid contracts. Fol-
lowing Athias and Saussier (2006), we take these to be neither fully exible nor
totally rigid. The latter reects the inability of the investor in a rigid contract
to reliably predict investment outcomes (both investment costs and revenues
arising). Major forecasting errors and/or major shocks cause signicant mal-
adaptation costs, which can be positive (e.g. where demand is much higher than
predicted for a toll road) as well as negative (e.g. substantive investment cost
overruns or unexpectedly low demand).
In subsequent sections, we analyse the dynamics of trust perceptions with
exible contracts, rigid contracts and hybrid contracts. We denote the degree of
exibility of the contract by (1  ). We dene fully exible contracts as those
where  = 0. This arises when a post-signing change in contract terms, and/or
a renegotiation is certain to occur. Note that we designated pre-specied regu-
latory reviews as renegotiations for the purpose of dening a exible contract.13
For fully rigid contracts,  = 1. This arises where post-investment changes in
contract terms and/or renegotiations are totally excluded. For hybrid contracts,
(i.e. those where there is some positive expectation of post-investment changes
in contract terms and/or renegotiations), 0 <  < 1, with a greater degree of
rigidity as  ! 1.
Any change in investment plans in an originally rigid contract is to be con-
sidered as a renegotiation. Pre-set periodic regulatory reviews are also treated
as a renegotiation as they examine and typically modify investment require-
ments as well as unscheduled regulatory tari¤ reviews. This choice is important
as it determines whether infrastructure contracts within an explicit regulatory
framework but with periodic reviews at a periodicity as specied in the contract
or equivalent are treated as fully exible contracts or as hybrid contracts. On
our denition, they are fully exible contracts but with k, the updating period,
relatively long e.g. each increment in k corresponding to 1-5 years and this
is what we have in mind in what follows. Of course, most regulatory systems
allow for interim reviews in cases of extreme maladaptation and that increases
the exibility.
13This is slightly di¤erent from the denition in Guasch (2004).
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However, each increment of k can be a short time period, of a fortnightly,
monthly or even more frequent form. However, in cases where each period in k
is genuinely this short, the notion of a genuinely pre-determined infrastructure
contract with periodic renegotiation has collapsed into a pure relational contract
comparable to many private sector relational contracts between companies and
their suppliers. This seems to be the position in countries where the contracting
parties meet regularly on a monthly or similar basis to review progress and revise
plans, including investment plans. We have in mind the arrangements observed
in the behind closed doorsdiscussions between governments and contractors
for infrastructure contracts in some Central American and African countries.
That leaves hybrid contracts. In our modeling, hybrid infrastructure con-
tracts (i.e. those where the probability of renegotiation, (1  ); is positive but
less than 1) are infrastructure contracts where renegotiation is possible post
investment but not pre-scheduled. This would cover concession contracts and
PPPs without an external regulatory or quasi-regulatory entity. It would also
cover those infrastructure contracts where a regulatory review is possible but
not obligatory. If both parties have to agree to a review, the contract is more
rigid; if a review follows an application by either party, it is more exible.
In what follows, we rst consider three types of fully exible contracts. We
then look at rigid contracts and nally, at the hybrid contract, where there
is a positive probability of ex post renegotiation. The three types of exible
contracts that we consider are:
1. The Athias and Saussier exible contract model, but including our trust-
worthiness parameters a and b.
2. The same model with a guaranteed pre-payment mechanism.
3. A benchmark, incentive compatible "F-contract" model with prepayments.
We show that in the third model the optimal solution sets prepayment terms
such that the total surplus split between the infrastructure company and the
government is identical to the one found in A&S, where trustworthiness terms
are absent from the model. Note that this is very di¤erent from the solutions
obtained with all the other models presented in this paper. We conclude by
comparing the e¢ ciency of the hybrid model to the rst exible contract model.
We now turn to the formal analysis where, in each of the subsequent discus-
sions we analyse the bargaining model that corresponds to each of the above
models. The time line of the models is as follows:
<    + k; k > 0
T y p e o f c o n t r a c t In v e s tm e n t s a n d p ay a r e s e t U p d a t in g o f in v e s tm e n t a n d p ay
a n d p aym en t p r ov i s io n s o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e d e c i s io n s in e x ib l e a n d e x ib l e
a r e ch o s e n a n d s ig n e d r e a l i s e d va lu e s o f w i t h p r e p aym en t s c o n t r a c t s
a; b, a n d  a t t im e  : R en e g o t ia t io n m ay o c c u r (1  )
P r e p aym en t s ( i f a n y ) a r e a l s o s e t in r ig id c o n t r a c t s
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3.1 Flexible contracts
Let us start with the exible contracts where we include into the expected
payo¤ functions the parameters a and b as announced respectively by the seller
(investing rm) and the buyer (government).
The rms expected prot function and the expected consumer surplus14 are
given by the following functions respectively:
f = P0   C0 + at  i
CSf = B0   P0 + fR(i)  bt
where B0 and C0 are positive constants representing, rstly, the social ben-
ets and, secondly, the costs of providing the basic service without any in-
vestment. t denotes the amount of payment going to the rm following rene-
gotiation between the company and the government on how the surplus R(i)
(R0 > 0; R00 < 0; R000 < 0) created by the investment i undertaken by the rm
will be shared between the two parties. f and  are inverse measures of the cost
of renegotiation and of the degree of asset specicity respectively. If  = 0 then
the investment is wholly sunk and hence has no opportunity cost. Therefore,
r(i) = R(i) is the proportion of the surplus R(i) which is not sunk and hence
has an opportunity cost. For infrastructure industries, r(i) is likely to have a
low value. For notational simplicity we shall henceforth refer to expected prots
and expected consumer surplus simply as prots and consumer surplus.
The Nash Bargaining solution will be used in the exible framework to de-
termine the payment going to the rm
(fR(i)  bt)(at  r(i)) (5)
The rst parenthesis shows the net gain of the investment to the buyer, while
the second parenthesis shows the yield to the seller after subtracting from the
expected payment the opportunity cost of its investment.
The participation constraint for the rm to enter in a contract with the
government in this country is
(a0 +  (1  a0 )) t > i  P0 + C0 (6)
The equation above clearly shows that the rms decision to enter a contract
with the government is critically dependent on the prior belief this company has
regarding the governments trustworthiness at the time  when the contract is
to be signed and the state of the institutional environment at that time. As we
have already discussed this prior may be the product of a history of previous
concession contracts in that country the success of which will lead to the upward
14Here we assume that the government fully represents the interests of the consumers. If
this full alignment hypothesis is dropped, then this can be easily reected by the model by
assigning appropriate weights to the consumer and producer surplus within the governments
objective function.
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revision of this prior, i.e. a positive externality of such contracts is internalised
in the decision of whether to participate in this new infrastructure contract. As
long as a > a; where a = i P0+C0t the rm will invest.
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On the other hand since it is the rm that makes the investment and pays
for it, the gain to the government is always positive. Therefore the contract,
once in place, never violates the governments participation constraint.
The payment solution16 at time  + k is:
tf;k =
akfR(i) + bR(i)
2ak b
=
fR(i)
2b
+
R(i)
2ak
(7)
The equation above suggests that the lower a and b are, the higher is t, the
value of the payment to the rm. However since the contract is exible, this
payment is updated in line with the values of trustworthiness perceptions. We
have inserted the time superscript of the elapsed periods since commencement
at time  , in order to denote the stage in the update mechanism of the sellers
belief regarding the buyers trustworthiness. For brevity we have removed the
subscript of the starting time in all variables except for a, where it is retained
to distinguish ak from the prior belief of the probability of payment, a =
a0 +  (1   a0 ). As we have already discussed  and b may also change from
time to time.
Conclusion 1 Better trustworthiness of the government buyer as estimated by
the seller and as perceived by the government for itself will lead to a lower t
paid, and hence a better deal for the country in terms of its share of the revenue
from the project.
This result is conrmed econometrically in a recent paper by McMillan and
Waxman (2007), where their evidence indicates that higher quality institutions
lead to a larger share of the revenues from the investment accruing to the coun-
try. In a sense an increase in a and/or b corresponds to a reduction in the
political risk premium and the cost of capital for a rm to accept a long dura-
tion contract with the government of a particular country. This reduction may
15Although not a possibility in our model, it is worth pointing out that if, for any reason, ak
becomes less than a, the investing rms participation constraint is violated and the contract
will collapse unless it can be successfully renegotiated so that once more ak > a. More rele-
vantly, since ak is progressively updated each period, it is possible that, after a few successful
periods, ak may come to exceed b if the latter has not increased by as much. This looks to
be important in understanding how overtrusting can develop. Such an explanation would t
well with the experience of Argentina pre-2002 as well and the London Underground Tube
and Metronet PPP collapse. There is a full discussion in the appendix (section 6) on the
absolute and relative values of a and b with some illustrative examples.
16Clearly the investment will only take place if fR(i)  bt > 0 and at  R(i) > 0: If both
expressions of the product in (5) are positive we can apply a monotonic transformation of
the expression into logarithms and easily check that both the FOC as well as the SOC are
satised. Moreover in the case of undertrusting since b > a:
fR(i) > bt > at > R(i)
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be viewed as an increase in the governments bargaining power (as McMillan
and Waxman argue), reected by the increase in its share of the surplus.
Substituting the above result back into the expected prot and consumer
surplus functions gives:
f;k = P0   C0 + a
k
fR(i)
2b +
R(i)
2   i
CSf;k = B0   P0 + fR(i)2   bak
R(i)
2
These expectations are continuously revised over time as the seller updates
its beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer, as well as a result of any
changes in b. Also note that the lower are sunk costs (i.e. the higher is ),
the higher are expected prots and the lower is the expected consumer surplus.
The prot maximising level of investment for the rm is:
if;k j R0(if;k) = 2b
akf + b
(8)
Hence investment decisions taken by the rm are updated in accordance to
its beliefs regarding the probability of payment by the buying government. It
follows that as R00 < 0, @i
f;k
@b < 0 while
@if;k
@ ;
@if;k
@ak
; @i
f;k
@f
> 0: Total expected
welfare at time  + k is:
W f;k = +CS = B0 C0+

ak + b
2b

fR(if )+

ak   b
2ak

R(if;k)  if;k (9)
From (8) if b > ak , then:
if;k j R0(if;k)b>ak =
2b
akf + b
>
2b
bf + b
=
2
f + 
= if j R0(if )b=ak<1 = if j R0(if )b=ak=1
(10)
Since R0 = 2b
akf+b
; it is easy to conclude that R0 is an increasing function
of b and a decreasing function of ak : As R
0 is an inverse function of investment
(since R00 < 0), this means that investment and surplus are decreasing functions
of b and increasing functions of ak . The above results indicate that
if;k
b=ak<1
= if;k
b=ak=1
and R(if;k
b=ak<1
) = R(if;k
b=ak=1
)
For high levels of investment and corresponding surplus what matters is that
b = ak irrespective of whether absolute trustworthiness levels are high or low.
Hence high levels of trustworthiness (b = ak = 1) are not necessarily required
to support optimal outcomes in investment and surplus, rather just matching
values of b and ak .
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Conclusion 2 Untrustworthy agents can potentially transact as e¢ ciently as
trustworthy agents provided that they hold similar estimates of the buyers com-
mitment to the payment agreement in the contract, provided that these are above
the necessary minimum level a. If the updating mechanism of trustworthiness
of the beliefs of the seller results into the buyer being trusted (by the seller) to
carry o¤ the payment to the degree that it deserves to be trusted (in terms of its
commitment), then investment levels will be as high as when the probability of
payment perceived by each side is one. Hence alignment of beliefs, rather than
whether the buyer government is per se a trustworthy contracting party, is the
most important issue in a fully exible model.
Conclusion 2 explains why some countries which are ruled by a tight and
corrupt elite where ak and b are both low but matching, can still sustain private
investment in sunk assets through renegotiation with a monopoly supplier (as
in the case of some sub-Saharan African countries). Note that this model of
matching expectations only works in exible contracts as it depends on contin-
uous updating and renegotiation, or within a relational contract arrangement.
Undertrusting adds a deadweight loss by making the expected welfare func-
tion directly dependent on  as indicated in (9). The higher  is (the lower
sunk costs are) then the higher this loss is. Moreover the surplus following rene-
gotiation is now multiplied by a factor a
k
+b
2b less than one, that measures the
degree of undertrusting.
Conclusion 3 Undertrusting is damaging not only because it reduces the in-
vestment and corresponding surplus accruing to the society, but also because it
reduces the welfare expectations by which a decision authority would rank this
contractual choice.
Note that the opposite conclusion holds for overtrusting. Overtrusting di-
rectly increases expected welfare in the two ways mentioned above. This means
that exible contracts where overtrusting is present (normally if ak overshoots
b as a result of uninterrupted updating in the former) will lead to big expected
welfare gains in the short run. However they are likely to end in rapid contract
collapse as soon as there is a realignment of expectations held by the investing
companies to more realistic values (viz. Argentina in the late 1990s).
Theorem 1 When renegotiation costs are su¢ ciently low and asset specicity
su¢ ciently high, expected welfare is a decreasing function of the governments
(buyers) perception of its trustworthiness and an increasing function of the
selling rms perception of the governments trustworthiness.
This holds when f >
b
ak
> 1: In other words for akf > b (b > a
k
 ), b
(ak ) has a negative (positive) indirect impact on expected welfare, reinforcing
the negative (positive) direct impact of the same parameter on the function.
Proof. Please refer to the mathematical appendix.
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As was shown earlier, if b > ak ; expected welfare W
f is smaller than it
would be if b was reduced to equal ak (and vice versa). Hence undertrusting
reduces expected welfare, just as overtrusting increases it (albeit temporarily as
mentioned earlier). Such a result does not require complete trustworthiness,
but rather only that b = ak . We now turn out attention to an attempt to tackle
the problem of trust misalignment with the use of prepayment contracts.
3.2 Prepayment contracts
As mentioned in page 5, prepayment contracts can be viewed broadly so as to in-
clude arrangements with partial risk guarantees, where the guarantee is against
the opportunism that may arise from the side of the government/regulator.
For exible contracts with prepayments, the Nash bargaining problem is:
(fR(i)  P0   bt)(P0 + ak t  r(i))
which gives a payment solution:
tP0;k =
akfR(i) + bR(i)  (ak + b)P0
2ak b
(11)
Substituting this back into the expected prot function and consumer surplus
functions gives:
P0 = P0   C0 + a
k
fR(i)+bR(i) (a+b)P0
2b   i =
(b a )P0
2b +
akf
2b R(i) +
b
2bR(i)  C0   i
CSP0 = B0   P0   a
k
fR(i)+bR(i) (a+b)P0
2ak
+ fR(i) =
= B0 +
(b ak )P0
2ak
+
akf
2ak
R(i)  b
2ak
R(i)
A prepayment will be set on the basis of the values at time  : The existence
of a prepayment will clearly a¤ect the participation constraint of the rm as a
will now become a = C0+i 
(b a )P0
2b
tP0
: As both expected prot as well as expected
consumer surplus are increasing functions of the prepayment, this can be set at
a maximum when there is an issue of undertrusting (b > a) :
P0 =
afR(i)+bR(i)
a+b
which if replaced into the above functions they become
P0;k =
(a+a
k
 )fR(i)+[2b+(a ak )]R(i)
2(a+b)
  C0   i
CSP0;k = B0 +
(a+a
k
 )[bfR(i) bR(i)]
2ak (a+b)
The prot maximising level of investment at time  + k is:
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iP0;k j R0(iP0;k) = 2(a + b)
(a + ak )f + [2b+ (a   ak )]
(12)
It is easy to check that R0(iP0;k) is decreasing in ak (for f > ), which
combined with ak = a means that it takes its maximum value for R0(iP0;k=0) =
a+b
af+b
: Clearly as R0 > 0; R00 < 0 and R00 < 0, then since b > ak = a :
R0(iP0;k>0) 6 R0(iP0;k=0) = a + b
af + b
< R0(if;k=0) =
2b
af + b
: (13)
It follows that at time  + k both the investment and the corresponding
surplus in a prepayment contract are higher than at time  ; which in turn are
higher than the investment and surplus in a exible contract at time  . The
inequality reads as:
iP0;k>0 > iP0;k=0 > if;k=0 and R(iP0;k>0) > R(iP0;k=0) > R(if;k=0): (14)
It is worth noting, that some of the appeal of a exible contract may be
restored over time if the trustworthiness of the government, as updated by
the seller during the life of the contract, increases upwards over time (albeit
in a snakes and ladders form). At su¢ ciently high levels of ak ; the level of
investment if;k>0 (which > if;k=0) may come to exceed rst iP0;k=0, and then
eventually even iP0;k>0 at the same time period. Therefore, at its later stages
and if upwards trustworthiness updating has not been frequently interrupted, a
lengthy exible contract with no prepayments may look as a preferable option
to the one with prepayments, in terms of the investment incentives the former
provides.17
The expected welfare function at time  (k = 0) is:
WP0;k=0 = B0   C0 + fR(iP0;k=0)  iP0;k=0 (15)
We next calculate the impact of b on WP0;k=0, again through the split of
the total derivative into a direct and an indirect e¤ect. As the direct e¤ect on
expected welfare is clearly equal to zero at time  , we get:
17Pre-payments may in practice involve an insurance premium paid to an agency that o¤ers
a regulatory risk or political guarantee. The cost of this insurance is not trivial and clearly
rises the longer the period for which it is taken out. Hence, the optimal use of such guarantees
is likely to be the minimum period necessary for ak to reach some desirable level after which
the guarantee can be allowed to lapse (assuming it has not previously been called). Hence,
the guarantee o¤ers a way in which countries can raise their reputation more quickly but then
revert to a standard exible contract without guarantees. Consequently, we typically observe
regulatory risk guarantees for 3-5 years or up to and including the period to the rst periodic
review by a new regulatory entity.
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dWP0
db =
@WP0
@iP0
@iP0
@b =
b(f )
(af+b)
a (f )
(af+b)2R00(iP0;k=0)
= ba (f )
2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k=0)
which clearly is negative as R00(iP0) < 0: Hence again b has a negative impact
on welfare in the case of a prepayment contract.
Similarly,
@WP0;k=0
@a
= @W
P0;k=0
@iP0;k=0
@iP0;k=0
@a
= b(f )
(af+b)
b(a f)
(af+b)2R00(iP0;k=0)
=
 b2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k=0)
> 0
Conclusion 4 Under prepayment contracts, expected welfare is a decreasing
function of the buying states probability of payment, and an increasing function
of the sellers estimate of receiving payment. The impact of each of these at
time  is limited only to their impact on the level of investment and neither
a¤ects the expected welfare function directly. As already noted the preference
for a prepayment contract relative to a exible one is decreasing in ak=0 :
Theorem 2 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢ cient are pre-
payment contracts compared to exible contracts.
Proof. Please refer to the mathematical appendix.
This gives us a preference relation for the decision maker between the two
types of contracts, dened in a similar way to that of Myerson relating prizes
(here welfare) to variable states of nature (here the occurrence of full payment),
where the latter encompasses all subjective unknowns which might inuence the
prize to be received.
Issues of incentive compatibility can exist in exible contracts. In particular,
it may be benecial for the buyer to declare an overestimate of his commitment
to pay given that this will reduce the share of the payment that goes to the
rm. Note that, even with the context of a prepayment contract the buyer may
still have an incentive to overstate b:
Theorem 3 Both the exible payment contracts and the exible prepayment
contracts are not always incentive compatible as buyer governments have a sig-
nicant incentive to exaggerate their stated trustworthiness.
Proof. Please refer to the mathematical appendix.
Therefore the buyer has an incentive to overstate his trustworthiness in both
types of contracts (exible pure and exible pre-payment) as long as the adverse
impact that an inated b has on investment is not so detrimental for it to more
than o¤set any direct gains accruing to the buyer by overstating his trustwor-
thiness.
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3.3 F-contracts
If we drop the assumption that the buyer will always honestly declare its esti-
mate of its own trustworthiness, then in this case it will be more appropriate to
use an F-prepayment contract of the form:
F = (fR(i)  P0   bt)ak (P0 + ak t  r(i))b
Such a contract allows the trustworthiness declared by each party to a¤ect
the payo¤ of the other party. This approach with the addition of prepayments
makes the payo¤s going to both parties independent of the trustworthiness pa-
rameters. As we will show below, the impact of undertrusting on investment
and welfare can be eliminated by establishing an F-contract.
The relevance of this model is not as a real world possible contract but in its
role as a hypothetical benchmark. However, it is probably not an unreasonable
representation of a repeated infrastructure contract in a developed country (e.g.
the twentieth toll road or water concession in France or licences for the fourth
major UK privatized infrastructure industry.) As we have seen exible contracts
become more di¢ cult to agree and sustain as b
ak
increases, because such con-
tracts are no longer incentive compatible. The level of e¢ ciency as measured
by welfare, achieved by the benchmark F-contract model is only possible in the
pure exible and exible prepayment contracts when ak = b.
For F-contracts, the payment solution is determined by maximising F with
respect to t:
t =
fR(i) + R(i)  2P0
ak + b
(16)
PF = P0   C0 + ak fR(i)+R(i) 2P0ak+b   i =
(b a)P0+akfR(i)+akR(i)
a+b   C0   i
CSPF = B0 P0  b fR(i)+R(i) 2P0ak+b +fR(i) = B0+
(b ak )P0+akfR(i) bR(i)
ak+b
As both of the above functions are increasing functions of the prepayment
amount, the latter needs to be increased as the level of undertrusting (b > ak )
increases. This eliminates the incentive for the state to announce a trustworthi-
ness higher than its true one in order to improve its share of consumer surplus
as the prepayment is:
P0 =
fR(i)+R(i)
2
which is independent of both a and b. This means that the prepayment is
time independent. If replaced into the expected prot and consumer surplus
functions these also become time independent and respectively equal to:
PF =
(ak+b)(fR(i)+R(i))
2(ak+b)
  C0   i = fR(i)2 + R(i)2   C0   i
CSPF = B0 +
(ak+b)fR(i) (ak+b)R(i)
2(ak+b)
= B0 +
fR(i)
2   R(i)2
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The prepayment prot maximising level of investment is:
iPF j R0(iPF ) = 2
f + 
(17)
WPF = B0   C0 + fR(iPF )  iPF (18)
We see that the investment decision within an F-contract is identical to
the one in the A&S model, and similarly the payments to the seller and the
buyer are independent of the trustworthiness parameters. The F-contracts fully
avoid the implications of trustworthiness by introducing a system of prepayments
such that both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ects of such parameters are
eliminated. This also means that the investment decisions taken by the rm are
not dependent on the updating mechanism of the sellers beliefs regarding the
trustworthiness of the buyer.
The key point is that the payments in the A&S model have now become
prepayments in the F-contracts. Hence, while the A&S model might be a not
unreasonable characterization of repeat infrastructure contracts in OECD coun-
tries with strong institutions and good prior histories, they omit key features
related to trust perceptions that are critical both in uncertain new contracts
(e.g. the rst prison PPP in any country) and many features that are crucial
for mobilizing private investment in developing countries.
Theorem 4 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢ cient an F-
contract compared to a exible one and to a exible prepayment one.
Proof. Please refer to the mathematical appendix.
Using expected welfare as a criterion, if ak < b; for k 2 [0; 1; 2; :::] an F-
contract will rank as superior to the other two types of exible contracts.
3.4 Rigid contracts
We dene rigid contracts as those that specify the main contract terms (e.g.
prices, payments, etc.) in advance of the investment and for the duration of
the contract. In addition, the contract permanently species the level of the
investments to be made.
Renegotiation is excluded from the theoretical model. However, in practice,
renegotiation cannot be excluded and is common not least to rescue projects
where one or both parties nds emerging outcomes becoming unacceptable.
Hence, the pure model is again, to a considerable extent, a hypothetical reference
model.
The model incorporates some of the rigidity implications via the introduction
of maladaptationcosts, which are dened as the di¤erence between expected
surplus levels and actual (outcome) surplus levels. The impact of maladap-
tation costs, f , falls on investment levels; the way in which this happens is
explained directly below. However, higher than expected maladaptation costs
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will inevitability increase the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract. This
latter issue is discussed in subsection 3.5, while here we temporarily assume that
such a probability is equal to zero.
In this model, the expected payo¤s are:
r = P0   C0 + afR(i)  i
CSr = B0   P0 + (1  fb)R(i)
The value of the maladaptation parameter, f < 1, is an inverse measure of
the potential size of the investors loss over the distribution of outcomes; e.g.
actual versus expected tra¢ c ows for toll roads. This parameter in our model
is multiplied by the investors expectation a that the buyer will pay him the
surplus agreed in the contract. Correspondingly, the surplus received by the
purchasing government is increased by this investors loss.
The rm will choose an investment level ir such that:
ir j R0(ir) = 1
af
(19)
So in this case the level of investment only depends on the prior belief held by
the seller regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer, a , and is not a¤ected by
any updating process regarding the trustworthiness of the buyer government.
In this model, expected welfare is:
W r = r + CSr = B0   C0 +

1 + (a   b)f

R(ir)  ir (20)
As in the case of exible uncertain contracts,W r is a decreasing function of b.
It is also an increasing function of a : For the case of a = b; the maladaptation
costs only inuence welfare indirectly (through their impact on investment). If
b > a (undertrusting) then the direct impact of f is negative and constitutes
a deadweight loss, while in the reverse case of overtrusting its direct impact on
welfare is positive.
The governments own perception of its trustworthiness only has a direct
e¤ect on welfare, as investment is not a¤ected by b. Hence:
dW r
db =  fR(ir) < 0
The impact of a on expected welfare still retains both a direct and an
indirect e¤ect:
dW r
da
= @W
f
@a
+ @W
r
@ir
@ir
@a
= fR(if ) +
h
1+(a b)f
af
  1
i
@ir
@a ,
dW r
da
= fR(if ) +
1 bf
af
@ir
@a
> 0
In other words, with undertrusting W r is an increasing function of a , i.e.
an increasing function of the sellers prior belief regarding the trustworthiness
of the buying state. Unlike the exible uncertain payment contracts, here the
actual size of the parameter a does matter on investment since if a = b < 1:
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ir j R0(ir)b=a<1 =
1
af
> ir j R0(ir)b=a=1 =
1
f
, ira=b<1 < ira=b=1 (21)
This implies that R(ir)b=a<1 < R(i
r)b=a=1.
In summary, for rigid contracts matching estimates of trustworthiness are
still important, but in this case, unlike the exible contract case, the absolute
level of the prior belief a is important and needs to be high. Good outcomes
on e¢ ciency and investment require both a to be close to one, as well as
aligned values between b and this prior belief. Hence, the sustainability of rigid
contracts and the investment and expected welfare outcomes of such contracts
depend considerably more on prior trustworthiness and institutional quality
than do exible contracts; they also require an alignment of perceptions from
the outset of the contract since there can be no updating of perceptions as it
happens in exible contracts.
3.5 Hybrid contracts
We nally analyse the hybrid model, where there is always some positive proba-
bility that subsequent to investment taking place, rigid contracts will be renego-
tiated, and/or key terms reset. The key issues that we explore in this section are
the relative e¢ ciency (in terms of welfare) between exible and hybrid models
in terms of the values of key parameters namely: i) maladaptation costs, ii) the
probability of renegotiation of an ex ante rigid contract, iii) sunk costs and iv)
renegotiation costs.
We follow the terminology of A&S and denote by (1   ) the probability
that an ex ante rigid contract will be renegotiated18 . We calculate the prot
function of the rm as:
H = r + (1  )f =
= 
 
P0   C0 + afR(i)  i

+ (1  )

P0   C0 + a
k
fR(i)
2b +
R(i)
2   i

,
H = P0   C0 + aR(i)

f +
(1  )akf
2ba
+
(1  )
2a

  i (22)
The prot maximising level of investment at time  + k will be:
iH;k j R0(iH;k) = 2
(2af   akb f   ) + a
k

b f + 
=
2b
2a bf + (1  )(akf + b)
(23)
18One-o¤ renegotiation or renegotiation by review other than pre-scheduled regulatory re-
view.
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So when  = 1; the results are identical to those of a rigid contract as the
government can credibly commit not to renegotiate the contract, while for  = 0
they coincide with those in the exible model discussed in the beginning of this
paper. We focus on the hybrid case where 0 <  < 1:
Calculating the di¤erence between the hybrid and the exible contracts,
CSH;k = CSr + (1  )CSf =   B0   P0 + (1  fb)R(i)+
+(1  )

B0   P0 + fR(i)2   bak
R(i)
2

=
B0   P0 +

(1  fb) + (1  ) f2   (1  ) bak

2

R(i)
Hence the expected welfare outcome in the hybrid contract at time  + k,
WH;k; is:
WH;k = B0   C0 +

 + f(a   b)

R(iH;k) + (1  )ak b
2ak
R(iH;k)+
+(1  )f ak+b2b R(iH:k)  iH;k
If we calculate the di¤erence between the expected welfare in a hybrid con-
tract and the expected welfare in a exible contract we get:
WH;k W f;k = +f(a b)R(iH;k)+

f
ak + b
2b
+ 
ak   b
2ak
 
(1  )R(iH;k) R(if:k)+
+iH;k   if;k (24)
We next calculate the impact on this di¤erence of all the parameters, namely
f; f;  and : We present the direct and indirect e¤ects (through investment)
of all these parameters in the appendix. The results lead us to the following
conclusions:
Proposition 1 Using expected welfare as a criterion, for akf > b and  > 0;
the lower are maladaptation costs (the higher is f), the more e¢ cient is the
hybrid model relative to the exible one. But if the negative direct e¤ect on
welfare comes to dominate the positive indirect one on investment, then the
exible model is more e¢ cient relative to the hybrid one.
Proof. Please refer to the mathematical appendix.
The proposition above may well help explain why contracts without exter-
nal regulatory or quasi-regulatory review are more di¢ cult to sustain the higher
is uncertainty regarding costs and revenues, as it is the degree of uncertainty
that largely determines the scale of maladaptation costs. Moreover note how
the existence of undertrusting gives rise to the requirement that sunk costs are
su¢ ciently high and renegotiation costs su¢ ciently low for akf > b to hold;
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a condition more demanding than in the corresponding proposition in the A&S
paper, where the necessary condition was that f > . Our analysis in the appen-
dix shows that the assumption akf > b implies that the impact of investment
on expected welfare is positive for both types of contracts

@WH
@iH
; @W
f
@if
> 0

:
Specically, the gap between f and  needs to be su¢ ciently high so that
when the former is multiplied by the updated belief of the rm regarding the
probability of pay by the government, ak < 1, and the latter by b (> a
k
 ), the
inequality does not change its direction. The more pronounced undertrusting
becomes (the higher the gap between b and ak is), the higher the di¤erence
between f and  needs to be for the proposition to hold.
In other words, the higher the level of undertrusting, the less likely is the
hybrid contract to be more e¢ cient. This is because an increase in the gap
between b and a will make the inequality akf > b increasingly more di¢ cult
to sustain. If it becomes unsustainable and akf < b; then the positive impact
of f on expected welfare will be far smaller and, possibly, even negative. Hence
substantial undertrusting may turn the tables in favour of the exible contract.
The next three propositions, which are all formally set out, proved and
analysed in the mathematical appendix, set the preference relations for a de-
cision maker between the hybrid and the exible contract based on expected
welfare.
Proposition 2 argues that the lower the probability to renegotiate is, the
more e¢ cient is a hybrid contract compared to a exible one. Undertrusting
lessens the positive impact of  on the expected welfare superiority of the hybrid
contract. The direct e¤ect of  may be negative; if this is the case it will
reduce or even dominate the positive indirect e¤ect of  on welfare. So extensive
undertrusting reduces the strength of this proposition and may even come to
reverse it.
Proposition 3 argues that the lower the asset specicity the more e¢ cient
a exible contract compared to a hybrid one. As long as we restrict the direct
negative impact of a higher  on the expected welfare of a hybrid contract to be
larger (in absolute terms) than the same impact on a exible contract (this can
be done by assuming a su¢ ciently low ); the direct e¤ect further reinforces the
welfare superiority of the exible contract as established in terms of the indirect
e¤ect.
Finally, according to proposition (4), provided that  is su¢ ciently large
for the positive direct e¤ect of f on expected welfare to be larger in a exible
rather than a hybrid contract, this direct e¤ect will reinforce the indirect e¤ect
in supporting the argument that the expected welfare superiority of the exible
model will increase as f increases.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We believe that our approach to the sustainability of long-run infrastructure
contracts (dened in the widest sense i.e. to include licences, franchises, etc.)
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based on trust levels and the relative alignment of trust perceptions between
seller companies and buyer governments sheds considerable light on some much
debated issues in infrastructure provision involving private investment. In par-
ticular, it provides a new perspective on the relative merits of Demsetz franchise
contracts relative to external regulation as discussed in Littlechild (2002). It also
provides a new perspective on the supposed benets of rigidity in infrastructure
contracts, especially rigid contracts in di¢ cult environments, as advocated by
Spiller and others.
Our modeling shows that infrastructure contracts are subject to serious time
inconsistency problems unless model assumptions are chosen so that these are
prevented, as is the case in the Athias and Saussier (2006) model. In gen-
eral, the expectations of sellers that contracts will be fully honoured by buyers
need not be the same as those of buyer governments. Sellersexpectations of
buyer governments performance will typically be lower, hence giving rise to
undertrusting, particularly for new types of contract, new regulatory or sim-
ilar institutions as well as for infrastructure contracts in countries with little
previous experience, etc.
The greater the misalignment of trust perceptions (i.e. the greater the gap
between initial seller and buyer perceptions of buyer government trustworthi-
ness), the higher the problem of suboptimal outcomes in investment and re-
duction in welfare expectations regarding infrastructure contracts. However, as
we show in our model, expectations can be updated over time with experience,
both directly and via the development of institutions that operate to support
contracts. A wide range of institutions is relevant to this including country
governance institutions such as law courts and others. However, an important
relevant one is whether or not there are e¤ective external and autonomous regu-
latory or quasi regulatory entities that can review and, where necessary, modify
infrastructure contracts under due process.
If such institutions exist and operate (including being allowed to operate)
e¤ectively, then they can do much to help improve the payment reputations of
governments. Of course, they may not be able (or allowed) to operate in this
way  and this is the case in many countries  but, where they can and do,
they provide an important additional component in sustaining trust between
infrastructure suppliers and country governments, in developed as well as in
developing countries.
Our approach here builds on the transactions cost model of Williamson and
provides additional reasons to favour regulation rather than Demsetz franchise
contracts for infrastructure at least where there are any signicant long-run
uncertainties on revenues and costs. There are clear benets to external regula-
tion as it helps to reduce or eliminate initial moderate trust misalignments by
raising absolute trust levels by establishing country payment reputation both
directly, by increasing ak and, indirectly by increasing the degree of institutional
quality . Both of these lead to a substantial upward revision in the probability
of payment and hence reputation.
Regarding rigid contracts (dened as those with no procedure for revising
investment requirements or for revising other conditions post-investment), we
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show that these are more di¢ cult to sustain than exible contracts. They
require high absolute levels of trust as well as trust alignment between the
parties. Precisely because they are xed from the start, the contracts cannot
benet from update improvements in perceptions from successful operation in
early contract periods. Hence, as is now well-known, tight contracts are very
brittle in the face of shocks and renegotiation can be di¢ cult.
Our model provides a theoretical underpinning to the skepticism about rigid
contracts given high failure rates for such contracts in developing countries.
Again, reputation and the benets of an e¤ective regulatory regime and process
involving bounded and accountable discretion - look to be superior to rigid con-
tracts. The problem, though, is that the latter may not be achievable in di¢ cult
environments. Nevertheless, our model produces additional arguments against
rigid-by-origininfrastructure contracts in institutionally di¢ cult environments.
The starting point for our modeling was the Athias and Saussier model. As
noted above, this is constructed so that time inconsistent solutions do not arise.
This is probably adequate for their purposes which were to explain renegoti-
ation probabilities for toll roads contrasts in France and, with few exceptions
some other OECD countries. Particularly on repeat contracts, one would ex-
pect few major trust misalignment issues. But, that does not apply either to
infrastructure contracts for new topics (including PPPs) nor does it apply to
most infrastructure contracts in middle and low income countries.
We have extended the A&S model so that it can not only handle variations
in the absolute level of trust perceptions but can also address trust misalign-
ments via a dynamic updating process. Hence, we have extended the model
so that it covers the necessary institutional environment to sustain private (or
privately funded) investment for new types of investment, new types of contrac-
tual arrangements and in countries where there is little previous history or
a record of previously problematic history. In addition, we have demonstrated
how this is likely to be linked to the existence of an external regulatory entity.
The basic A&S model generally suits well infrastructure contracts with pri-
vate investment where trust levels between buyers and sellers are high and there
are no trust misalignments. However, our modeling suggests that for moderate
undertrusting, exible contracts, maybe with prepayment, particularly in rst
few years of contract are likely to be superior provided that the updating period
- via pre-xed regulatory or similar reviews - is relatively long (i.e. at least 1
year, preferably 3-5 years). For more serious undertrusting, the solution above
may perhaps be successful but, particularly if accompanied by low absolute lev-
els of trust, we suspect that the best chance to proceed is via fully exible,
quasi-relational contracts. Rigid contracts only seem worthwhile if there is little
inherent uncertainty, particularly on post-investment revenues.
5 REFERENCES
Anderson, J. and Young, L. (2006), Trade and Contract Enforcement, The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 5:1 (Contributions), article 30.
29
Araujo, L. and Ornelas, E. (2007), Trust-Based Trade,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=642803
Athias, L. and Saussier, S. (2006), Contractual Design of Toll Adjustment
Provisions in Infrastructure Contracts, Atom-U, Paris-Sorbonne,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=828944
Aumann, R. (1976), Agreeing to Disagree, The Annals of Statistics, Vol.
4, pp 1236-1239.
Bolt, C. (2003), Regulating the London Underground, Beesley Lecture,
www.ppparbiter.org.uk
Bolt, C. (2007), Regulating by Contract and by Licence The Relationship
between Regulatory Form and its E¤ectiveness, CRI Bath and
www.ppparbiter.org.uk
Braynov, S. and Sandholm, T. (2002), Contracting with Uncertain Level of
Trust, Computational Intelligence, Vol.18, No. 4, pp 501-514.
De Brux, J. (2008), The Dark and Blue Sides of Renegotiation: An Appli-
cation to Transport Concession Contracts, Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne,
Universit·e Paris 1 Panth·eon Sorbonne.
Greif, A. (2006), Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons
from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press.
Greif, A. (1993), Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early
Trade: The Maghribi TradersCoalition, American Economic Review, Vol. 83
(3) , pp 525-548.
Guasch, J.L. (2004), Granting and Renegotiating Concession Contracts:
Doing It Right, World Bank Institute.
Guasch, J.L. and Straub, S. (2006), Renegotiation of Infrastructure Con-
cessions: An Overview, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 77,
No 4.
La¤ont, J.J. (2005), Regulation and Development, Cambridge University
Press.
Levine, P., Stern, J. and Trillas, F. (2005), Utility Price Regulation and
Time Inconsistency: Comparisons with Monetary Policy, Oxford Economic
Papers, Vol. 57, pp 447-478.
Littlechild, S.L. (2002), Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity
Distribution Contract, Review of Network Economics, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp 1-38.
McMillan, M.S. and Waxman, A. (2007), Prot Sharing Between Host
Countries and Multinationals in Natural Resource Extraction: An Empirical
Investigation, Brookings Trade Forum.
McMillan, J. and Woodru¤, C. (1999), Interrm Relationships and Informal
Credit in Vietnam, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, pp 1285-1320.
Macaulay, S. (1963), Non Contractual Relations in Business, American
Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (1), pp. 55-70.
Menard, C. and Saussier, S. (2002), Contractual Choice and Performance:
Water Supply in France, in E. Brousseau and J.M. Glachant (eds.) The Eco-
nomics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press.
Myerson, R.B. (1979), An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability,
Utility, and Evaluation Functions, Theory and Decision, Vol. 11, pp 339-352.
30
Spiller, P.T. (2008), An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regula-
tory Implications, National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper 14152,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152
Spiller, P. (2004), An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts, ISNIE Con-
ference 2004.
Stern, J. (2005), Regulation and Contracts: The Inevitability of Discretion,
CCRP Workshop, Barcelona, Spain.
Stern, J. (2003), Regulation and Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?
Lessons from UK Historical Experience, Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 6, No
4, December 2003.
Tirole, J. (2008) Cognition and Incomplete Contracts, American Economic
Review, forthcoming.
Williamson, O.E. (1976) The Economics of Internal Organization: Exit and
Voice in Relation to Markets and HierarchiesAmerican Economic Review, Vol.
66, No 2, pp 369-377.
31
6 APPENDIX - TRUST PERCEPTION VAL-
UES AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In the literature to date, there is no distinction between trust levels between
investors and (buyer) governments. Indeed, the implicit assumption is that there
is no misalignment between these two. However, this may be an unfortunate
simplication.
The reality is not only that contracts are most likely to break down when
there is such misalignment, but also that as we have theoretically shown it is
unlikely to achieve incentive compatible contracts unless perceptions can be
aligned either initially or during the course of the contract. That, in turn, may
help explain whether infrastructure contracts that run into di¢ culties can be
renegotiated between the parties and whether a regulatory or quasi-regulatory
entity is likely to be necessary to sustain the viability of the contract.
Our conjecture is that in circumstances where the sellers perception of the
reliability of the buyer is much lower than the buyers, the contract is most
likely to break down irrevocably. For contracts where the sellers updated per-
ception of the buyers reliability overshoots (is higher than justied given the
buyers type, e.g. there is overtrusting), contracts may continue satisfactorily
until the misalignment is revealed at which point they are likely to fall apart
rapidly. Conversely, contracts can survive where the levels of trust are low but
perceptions are correctly aligned.
Some illustrative examples
The role of an external regulatory or similar entity may be crucial for con-
tinued operation of the contract. For undertrusting, de Brux (2008) provides
a particularly striking example. She discusses the rst worldwide airport con-
cession which happened in the Kingdom of Cambodia, a country with a very
weak judicial system, widespread corruption and no previous history of conces-
sion contracts . A French infrastructure company had a signed a concession
contract in 1995 not just to run and extensively modernise the existing airport
but also to build a new one. However, during the summer of 1997 the Asian
economic crisis started to spread over Cambodia while, at the same time, a
military insurrection took place in the capital of the country. Given the poor
revenue outlook and export protection of the original contract - the French
infrastructure company was willing to walk away and the Cambodian govern-
ment was also willing for the original contract to be terminated. However both
parties, after months of renegotiation, successfully amended the contract but
only with the external mediating assistance of a French government representa-
tive. The success of the renewed contract (which is still in operation) came from
the fact that both parties were persuaded by this external party to allow the
spirit rather than the letter of the contract (which allowed termination of the
agreement by either side under such extreme circumstances) to prevail. Coop-
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eration through renegotiation prevailed over opportunism in this case, but only
thanks to a quasi-regulatory review by an external party.
Another important similar but bad outcome - example is given in Spiller
(2008) regarding the water operation and management concession contract in
the City of Atlanta. In this case, the operator claimed within a year or so of
the start of the contract that the target and annual fees agreed were far too
low and requested a renegotiation. Such a renegotiation would have had to
have been directly between the parties - external regulatory review was not an
option. However, because of the political costs of the renegotiation, the City
of Atlanta preferred to take back the contract at a cost of $40 million/year on
a $22 million/year contract. In this case, the problem was third-party oppor-
tunism rather than government opportunism leading to  a highly rigid contract
forcing [the parties] to renegotiate or terminateand, in this case, ending up in
termination.
In the case of overtrusting, the issue is often that investing rms have exag-
gerate perceptions of the degree of the independence and power of a supposedly
independent regulator. That can be argued for both Argentina and Hungary
energy privatizations in the 1990s - and also, perhaps, for the failure of the Lon-
don Underground Tube Metronet PPP in spite of the best e¤orts of the PPP
Arbiter. Note that, in both cases, the contract had operated for some years in
a new environment but with no serious need to test the credibility of the new
regulatory entity (no news). In consequence, the sellers perceived trust that
they would get paid in full in all circumstances appears to have overshot the
true level and generated the overtrusting apparent at the point of crisis.
Trust perception cases; a typology
Most of the discussion on trust and most of the theoretical models in this
eld accept that a and b can be high or low depending on the country or project
but, implicitly or explicitly assume that a = b. However, there are circumstances
where a and b are both low (e.g. under 0.5) but both parties have the same
perspective and hence private investment in infrastructure may be sustainable.
Conversely, there may be circumstances where a and b are both relatively high
(e.g. above 0.5) but a is su¢ ciently less than b so as to create a signicant
degree of mistrust.
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Table 1
Perceptions of Trustworthiness
Case (A) Case (C)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with strong institutions Country with strong institutions
and high trustworthiness reputation and high trustworthiness reputation
a = b; a; b  ! 1 (large) a < b; a; b & 0:5 (moderate)
Case (B) Case (D)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with weak and/or Country with past history of weak
corrupt institutions and/or corrupt institutions but trying to
establish reputation for trustworthiness
a = b; a; b  ! 0 a < b; a; b < 0:5 (small)
We can illustrate the arguments in our theoretical model - at least for un-
dertrusting - by setting out a simple typology, based on a 4 quadrant table as
in Table 1 above. We can then discuss some illustrative examples on each case
as set in this table.19 . Let us briey consider each quadrant in turn.
Case (A) represents well-established types of project in high reputation coun-
tries. For many types of infrastructure concession contracts, trust is likely to
be high and the contracting parties may well be able to monitor, enforce and
revise their contracts straightforwardly, without a need for external assistance
(other than occasionally for arbitration/dispute resolution or similar) or for pre-
paymentarrangements. Hence, private investment is readily forthcoming and
at a reasonable cost of capital as perceived risk is low. Examples include repeat
water supply management contracts in easy to access and process water (as in
Menard and Saussier), repeat UK PPP contracts in politically uncontentious
sectors, electricity distribution in Chile. This is a sustainable and e¢ cient
process that is potentially welfare maximising and which also corresponds to
the A&S model.
Case (B) represents infrastructure contracts in countries with low quality in-
stitutions. Supplying companies can and do have supply contracts with govern-
ments in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere where government
is arbitrary and/or corrupt  and liable to change on the replacement of the
current autocrat.
The key point is that as previously discussed, these are essentially relational
contracts where the monitoring, enforcement and revision is done between the
two parties who know one another well. The contracts will only be sustainable
if the supplier can expect to receive a return adjusted for higher risks and for
any (potentially large) corruption payments both buyer and seller may receive
returns from corrupt practices. This process is sustainable (at least while the
19We discuss overtrusting below but it cannot be captured as in Table 1.
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current parties continue in place) but it is highly ine¢ cient and far from welfare
maximizing.
Case (C) represents early and potentially di¢ cult contracts in high reputa-
tion countries. In the UK, the London Underground PPPs were in this category
as were the NATS air tra¢ c control contract and early PPPs in hospitals and
prisons. In these cases, to sustain the contract, it clearly helps to have an exter-
nal regulatory entity the PPP Arbiter for the London Underground, the Civil
Aviation Authority for NATS.
Note that in most of these cases, there has been an explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantee providing a pre-paymentfacility. There clearly are potential
incentive compatibility problems so that breakdown is likely in the case of ma-
jor disputes. But, provided the rst contract (or rst few years of the contract)
go well and any major problems are addressed by successful renegotiation (as
with NATS), subsequent contracts or periods should go well. This is because
updating means that ak becomes equal to or close to b.
Most of these contracts faced not only signicant political risk, but most
also had serious construction, technology, and/or demand risks. The London
Underground contracts also had major issues of ongoing rather than front-loaded
investment. Interestingly, an early major success for UK PPPs was the Dartford
bridge crossing of the River Thames. For that project, an e¤ective and robust
pre-paymentmechanism was put in place through allowing the duration of
the concession to correspond to that necessary for the contractor to recover his
principal and earn an agreed rate of return (i.e. an NPV contract).
Finally, Case (D) represents countries that start with poor reputations but
are trying hard to obtain private investment into infrastructure e.g. into roads,
power generation, sometimes water. To attract that investment, governments
may pass concession laws, introduce independent regulators or allow external
arbitration or similar. Examples of such countries include Uganda, Nigeria,
Mozambique and Romania. Several of these also adopted pre-payment arrange-
ments via regulatory risk guarantees.
However, supplying companies are likely to want a demonstrable record of
achievement for those institutions before reducing their cost of capital risk pre-
mia. Hence, the private investment may not be possible  at least not at a
cost that would be acceptable in terms of the nal tari¤. In these circum-
stances, private investment will only be forthcoming and sustainable if there
is external support in place e.g. from an e¤ective pre-paymentagreement as
well as the eventual establishment of external regulatory or similar institutions.
That is where transitional regulatory risk guarantees and other forms of ex-
ternal underpinning (e.g. on-demand guarantees, bilateral investment treaties,
comprehensive credit insurance, etc.) can help align perceptions or relative
trustworthiness.
If this process is successful and the country oats away from the (hope-
fully unused) pre-payment support, the result is an e¢ cient equilibrium with
realigned trust perceptions.
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7 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
We rst show that W f;k is a decreasing function of b. To calculate the
impact of b on W f;k we split this into a direct and an indirect e¤ect; the latter
evaluates the impact of b onW f;k via the impact of b on the level of investment.
Hence:
dW f;k
db =
@W f;k
@b +
@W f;k
@if
@if;k
@b =   2a
k

(2b)2 fR(i
f;k)  1
2ak
R(if;k)+h
ak+b
2b f
2b
akf+b
+
ak b
2ak
 2b
akf+b
  1
i
@if;k
@b =
  2ak
(2b)2
fR(if;k)  1
2ak
R(if;k) +
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
@if;k
@b =
=   2ak
(2b)2
fR(if;k)  1
2ak
R(if;k) +
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
2ak f
(ak f+b)
2
R00(if;k) ,
dW f;k
db
=   2a
k

(2b)
2 fR(i
f;k)  1
2ak
R(if;k) +
2fb(akf   b)
(akf + b)
3R00(if;k)
(25)
If b > ak (undertrusting) and
f
 >
b
ak
> 1; @W
f;k
@if;k
=
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
> 0; and
@R0(if;k)
@b =
2akf
(akf+b)
2 > 0. The latter implies a negative impact of b on the level
of investment if;k since @i
f;k
@b =
@if;k
@R0(if;k)
@R0(if;k)
@b =
@R0(if;k)
@b
R00(if;k) < 0. Therefore,
b has a negative indirect impact on expected welfare, reinforcing the negative
direct impact.
Similarly, we calculate the impact of ak on W
f :
dW f;k
dak
= @W
f;k
@ak
+ @W
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@ak
= 12bfR(i
f;k) + 2b
(2ak )
2R(i
f;k)+h
ak+b
2b f
2b
akf+b
+
ak b
2ak
 2b
akf+b
  1
i
@if;k
@ak
=
1
2bfR(i
f;k) + 2b
(2ak )
2R(i
f;k) +
b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
@if;k
@ak
As @R
0(if;k)
@ak
=  2bf
(akf+b)
2 < 0; this implies a positive impact of ak on the
level of investment if;k since @i
f;k
@ak
= @i
f;k
@R0(if;k)
@R0(if;k)
@ak
=
@R0(if;k)
@ak
R00(if;k) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
Taking the di¤erence betweenWP0 W f at time  (k = 0) and di¤erentiating
with respect to b gives:
@(WP0 W f )
@b =
2a
(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f )  b(af b)
a (af+b)
@if
@b +
b(f )
(af+b)
@iP0
@b =
2a
(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f )  2fb(af b)
(af+b)3R00(if )
+ ba (f )
2
(af+b)3R00(iP0 )
=
= 2a
(2b)2
fR(if ) + 12a R(i
f ) + b
(af+b)3
a (f )2R00(if ) 2f(af b)R00(iP0 )
R00(if )R00(iP0 )
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where since R00; R000 < 0 and iP0 > if we have that R00(iP0) < R00(if ) < 0:
Analogously,
@(WP0 W f )
@a
=  b
2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0 )
  12bfR(if )  2b(2a )2R(if )+
2fb2(af b)
a (af+b)3R00(if )
=
=   12bfR(if )  2b(2a )2R(if )  b
2
a (af+b)3
a (f )2R00(if ) 2f(af b)R00(iP0 )
R00(if )R00(iP0 )
Hence unless f
2 2
2f
< ba 120 and  b
2
a (af+b)3
a (f )2R00(if ) 2f(af b)R00(iP0 )
R00(if )R00(iP0 ) >
1
2bfR(i
f )+ 2b(2a )2R(i
f ); we will have that @(W
P0 W f )
@b is positive and
@(WP0 W f )
@a
negative. Hence as undertrusting increases because a decreases and/or b de-
creases, a prepayment contract becomes more e¢ cient in relation to a exible
contract.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let us assume a falsely declared beta (say bdl) higher that the true beta (say
btr). By totally di¤erentiating the payment solution in (8) we get that:
dtf;k
dbdl
= @t
f;k
@bdl
+ @t
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@bdl
=  fR(i
f;k)
2(bdl)2
+

1
ak

@if;k
@bdl
< 0
Hence as
CSf;k = B0   P0 + fR(if;k)  btrtf;k ,
dCSf;k
dbdl
= f 2b
dl
akf+b
dl
@if;k
@bdl
  btr dtf;k
dbdl
,
dCSf;k
dbdl
= btr
fR(if;k)
2(bdl)2
+
1
akf + b
dl
(2fak b
dl   fak btr   btrbdl)
ak
@if;k
@bdl
(26)
As f >  and 1 > bdl > btr, the term in the brackets is positive and hence the
overall indirect e¤ect is negative. Hence the buyer has an incentive to overstate
his trustworthiness as long as the impact of an inated b on investment is not so
detrimental as to substantially reduce both i and hence R (which are determined
by the rm given its prot maximising investment decision) to such an extent
that more than o¤sets any direct gains for the buyer.
Similarly, for the case of prepayments, by totally di¤erentiating P0 =
afR(i)+b
dlR(i)
a+bdl
,
we get that:
dP0
dbdl
= @P0
@bdl
+ @P0
@iP0
@iP0
@bdl
=
 afR(i)
(a+bdl)2
+ R(i)(a+b
dl) bdlR(i)
(a+bdl)2
+

a+b
dl
af+bdl

af+b
dl
a+bdl
@iP0
@bdl
,
dP0
dbdl
= a ( f)R(i)
(a+bdl)2
+ @i
P0
@bdl
< 0
20This is rather unlikely: clearly f
2 2
2f
is an increasing function of f and a decreasing
function of ; hence unless the former is small and the latter large this inequality is unlikely
to hold. If f

> b
a
> 1; it is more likely than not that f
2 2
2f
> b a
a
rather than the other
way round.
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Hence as
CSP0 = B0   P0 + fR(i)  0btr ,
dCSP0
dbdl
= f a+b
dl
af+bdl
@iP0
@bdl
  dP0
dbdl
,
dCSP0
dbdl
=
a (f   )R(i)
(a + bdl)2
+
bdl(f   )
af + bdl
@iP0
@bdl
(27)
Hence again the buyer has an incentive to overstate his trustworthiness pro-
vided that the impact of an inated b on investment is not so detrimental that
the reduction in investment as denoted by the second term in the relation above
more than o¤sets any direct gains to the buyer (as denoted by the rst term).
However, unlike dCS
f
dbdl
; dCS
P0
dbdl
does not depend on the magnitude of the true
value of b; btr:
Proof of Theorem 4
Comparing the PF solution (prepayment F-contracts) to those of pure ex-
ibility contracts f or prepayment ones, it is easy to show that for b > a > ak :
R0(iPF ) = 2
f+
6 R0(iP0;k) = 2(a+b)
(a+ak )f+[2b+(a ak )]
R0(iPF ) = 2
f+
6 R0(if;k) = 2b
af+b
it follows that iPF > iP0;k; iPF > if;k and R(iPF ) > R(iP0;k), R(iPF ) >
R(if;k):
As @W
PF
@iPF
= fR0(iPF )   1 = 2f f 
f+
= f 
f+
, @i
PF
@b =
@iPF
@R0(iPF )
@R0(iPF )
@b =
@R0(iPF )
@b
R00(iPF ) = 0 and
@R0(iPF )
@b = 0, both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ects
of b on welfare are zero. Hence taking the di¤erence between WPF  W f and
di¤erentiating with respect to b gives:
@(WPF W f;k)
@b =
2ak
(2b)2
fR(if;k) + 1
2ak
R(if;k)  b(akf b)
ak (a
k
f+b)
@if;k
@b > 0
Hence the higher b is, the more e¢ cient is the F- prepayment contract as
compared to the pure exible contract of A&S.
Similarly both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ect of a on WPF is zero,
and hence the lower ak is, the more e¢ cient an F- prepayment contract as
compared to a exible contract.
In an analogous manner, we compare the expected welfare implications of
an F-contract to that of a prepayment contract. Calculating:
WPF  WP0;k = fR(iPF )  iPF   fR(iP0;k) + iP0;k
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and di¤erentiating WP0;k with respect to b gives:
dWP0;k
db =
@WP0;k
@b +
@WP0
@iP0;k
@iP0;k
@b =
@WP0;k
@b +
@WP0
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@b
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@R0(iP0;k)
The direct e¤ect of b on the expected welfare in a prepayment contract is:
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k
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k
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2(ak )(a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2 > 0
The indirect e¤ect of b on the expected welfare in a prepayment contract
will the product of the following three terms:
@WP0;k
@iP0;k
=
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)(a+2b ak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 )f+(2b+a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; @R
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@R0(iP0;k) =
1
R00(iP0;k)
So,
@WP0;k
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k)
@b
@iP0;k
@R0(iP0;k) =
(f )2(a+2b ak )(a+ak )
[(a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 )f+(2b+a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3
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At time  the direct e¤ect is equal to zero and we have that:
@(WPF WP0;k)
@b = 
(f )2ba
[(af+b]
3
R00(iP0;k)
> 0
Hence the higher b is, the more e¢ cient the F-prepayment contract is as
compared to the prepayment contract, and this e¤ect tends to be intensied
towards the beginning of the contract where a is lower. If later on during the
life of the contract there is upwards updating in the trust beliefs held by the
rm, then this will reduce the superiority of such F contracts.
The opposite result will hold for a as:
@(WPF WP0;k)
@a
= 0 + b
2(f )2
(af+b)3R00(iP0;k)
< 0:

Next, we set out in detail the proofs for the four propositions referred to in
section 3.5. For  > 0; iH;k > if;k, R(iH;k) > R(if;k) we require that R0(iH;k) <
R0(if;k), which holds if:
2a bf   akf > b (28)
It then follows that R
00
(iH;k) < R
00
(if;k) < 0.
We now look at the impact of parameters on investment. First we look at
the impact of  :
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it follows that
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@
<
@if;k
@
(29)
Also, for the impact on investment of renegotiation costs, f :
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Hence as above,
@iH;k
@f
<
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The impact of the maladaptation parameter, f is:
@if;k
@f = 0
@iH;k
@f =
@R0(iH;k)
@f
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 b2
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))2
R00(iH;k) > 0
Therefore:
@iH;k
@f
>
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@f
= 0 (31)
The impact of b :
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@b
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=
2ak f
(ak f+b)
2
R00 (iH;k)
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2
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R00(if;k) >   1R00(iH;k) > 0
 
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 f
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)2
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2(1 )ak f
[2a bf+(1 )(af+b)]2
R00 (iH;k)
,
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0 >
@iH;k
@b
>
@if;k
@b
(32)
Also the impact of ak :
@if;k
@ak
=
@R0(if;k)
@ak
R00 (if;k)
=
 2bf
(ak f+b)
2
R00 (iH;k)
> 0
@iH;k
@ak
=
@R0(iH )
@ak
R00 (iH;k)
=
 2b(1 )f
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R00 (iH;k)
> 0
We have that,
2bf > 2b(1  )f
and,
1
(akf+b)
2
> 1
[2a bf+(1 )(akf+b)]
2
Moreover,
0 > R00(if;k) > R00(iH;k),   1
R00(if;k) >   1R00(iH;k) > 0
Therefore,
 
 2bf
(ak f+b)
2
R00 (if;k)
>  
 2b(1 )f 4b2f
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R00 (iH;k)
,
@iH;k
@ak
<
@if;k
@ak
(33)
Finally, we examine the impact on investment on the probability or renego-
tiation, :
@if;k
@ = 0
and
@iH;k
@ =
@R0(iH;k)
@
R00 (iH;k)
=
 2b[2a bf ak f b]
[2a bf+(1 )(ak f+b)]
2
R00 (iH;k)
> 0
Hence,
@iH;k
@
>
@if;k
@
= 0 (34)
To derive the indirect impact of the above parameters on expected welfare,
we rst need to calculate the investment derivatives @W
H;k
@iH;k
and @W
f;k
@if;k
respec-
tively.
When calculating the indirect e¤ect on expected welfare in the exible and
hybrid rigid models we impose the condition:
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0 <
@WH;k
@iH;k
=
b
ak
2a (1  fb) + (1  )(akf   b) 
2a bf + (1  )(akf + b)
 < @W f;k
@if;k
=
b
ak
(akf   b)
(akf + b)
(35)
For the above to hold, it su¢ ces to show that:
2a (1  fb) + (1  )(akf   b)

(akf + b) < 
2a bf + (1  )(akf + b)

(akf   b),
2a (1  fb)(akf + b) < 2a bf(akf   b),
(akf + b) < bf(a
k
f   b) + fb(akf + b),
(1  bf)(akf + b)  bf(akf   b) < 0,
b < akf(2bf   1) (36)
If a
ak
> f , then
akf(2bf   1) < 2a bf   akf:
This means that inequality (36) implies inequality (28), while if a
ak
< f ,
(28) implies (36). Remember that what has also been assumed so far is that
akf > b: Therefore, (36) can be true provided that 2bf   1 is positive and
su¢ ciently close to one for the direction of the inequality to be retained.
Proof of Proposition 1
Obviously both the direct as well as the indirect e¤ect of f on expected wel-
fare under a exible contract is zero. Hence @i
H;k
@f >
@if;k
@f = 0 , @W
H;k
@iH
@iH;k
@f >
@W f
@if
@if
@f = 0: Moreover as the direct e¤ect of f on W
H;k is equal to (a  
b)R(iH;k) < 0 this means that the e¢ ciency of the hybrid model relative to the
exible one is eroded by the existence of a deadweight loss in the case of un-
dertrusting. If the negative direct e¤ect on WH;k is dominated by the positive
indirect e¤ect onWH;k, then the higher f (i.e. the lower the misalignment cost
is), the more e¢ cient the hybrid contract is compared to a exible one. On the
other hand, if the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect the reverse will be
the case. However the latter is unlikely to happen for as long as f >
b
ak
> 1 as
the gap in the value of b and ak will be exceeded by the gap in the values of f
and : 
For the next proposition, we shall add to the assumption akf > b; assump-
tion (28) that 2a bf   fak > b. As already mentioned, this latter inequality
assumption implies that:
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iH;k > if;k;
R(iH;k) > R(if;k);
R0(iH;k) < R0(if;k);
R00(iH;k) < R00(if;k):
Proposition 2 For akf > b; 2baf   fak > b and  > 0, the lower the
probability to renegotiate a rigid contract (the higher ); the more e¢ cient a
hybrid contract compared to a exible one.
Proof. If b < 2baf   akf , then @i
H;k
@ >
@if;k
@ = 0: This means that given
(28):
@WH
@iH;k
@iH;k
@ >
@W f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@ = 0
Moreover in the hybrid contract there is a direct e¤ect of the same parameter
equal to:
[1 + f(a   b)]R(iH;k)  a
k
 b
2ak
R(iH;k)  f ak+b2b R(iH;k),
2R(iH;k)
4ak b
[2ak b+ 2a
k
 bf(a   b)  b(ak   b)  ak (ak + b)f ]
For the direct e¤ect to reinforce the indirect one, the former should be pos-
itive, which is the case as:
2bak > a
k
 (a
k
 + b)f + b(a
k
   b)  2ak bf(a   b),
2bak > a
k
 (a
k
f + b  2bfa ) + b(akf   b+ bakf)
bak (1  f) + bak (1  f) + b > ak (akf + b  2bfa )
Given (28) akf + b   2bfa < 0, and hence the above inequality always
holds.
For the remaining two propositions, we shall start from the requirement that
the impact of investment on expected welfare in a hybrid contract is smaller that
the impact of investment on expected welfare in a exible model (0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
<
@W f;k
@if;k
). As already shown, this requires inequality (36), which is re-written
below, to hold:
akf(2bf   1) > b()
f >
akf + b
2ak bf

>
akf + b
2ak b
=
f
2b
+

2ak
>
f + 
2

Hence inequality (36) imposes further size boundaries for f; f and . In
particular, the lower boundary for the value of f; which is an inverse measure
of the misalignment costs, becomes even more restrictive than in Proposition
2. More simply, the maladaptation costs are smaller (i.e. f is higher) than the
level needed to ensure that as the probability of renegotiation decreases, the
hybrid contract becomes more e¢ cient relative to the exible one. Assuming
that af > b; (28) and (36) all hold we have the following two propositions:
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Proposition 3 For 0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
< @W
f;k
@if;k
and 0 <  < R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
; the lower
the level of asset specicity (i.e. the higher ), the more e¢ cient the exible
contract compared to the hybrid contract.
Proof. Concerning the indirect e¤ects, given that 0 < @i
H;k
@ <
@if;k
@ ,
@WH;k
@iH;k
@iH;k
@ <
@W f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@ ;
if (36) and (28) both hold. As already discussed the direct e¤ect of  on
expected welfare is negative in both contracts given the introduction of a dead-
weight loss if ak < b: Hence for this negative impact to be of a smaller absolute
size for the exible compared to the hybrid contract, so that the above inequality
is preserved, the condition is that
(1  )R(iH;k) > R(if;k),  < R(iH;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
The upper boundary set for  reects the requirement that the direct e¤ect
(deadweight loss) of  on welfare is (in absolute terms) smaller in the exible
contract than in hybrid one. This combined with the indirect e¤ect of  will
imply that d(W
H;k W f;k)
d < 0; and therefore proposition 3 applies.
Proposition 4 For 0 < @W
H;k
@iH;k
< @W
f;k
@if;k
and  > R(i
H;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
; the lower
the renegotiation costs (i.e. the higher f); the more e¢ cient a exible contract
compared to a hybrid contract.
Proof. Given that 0 < @i
H;k
@f
< @i
f;k
@f
,
@WH;k
@iH;k
@iH;k
@f
< @W
f;k
@if;k
@if;k
@f
;
if (36) is satised which means that (35) holds. Therefore there is a larger
indirect e¤ect for the exible as compared to the hybrid model. This will be
strengthened by the direct e¤ect if (1 )R(iH;k) < R(if;k),  > R(iH;k) R(if;k)
R(iH;k)
as then @W
H;k
@f
< @W
f;k
@f
. In other words, the lower boundary for  reects the
requirement that the direct positive e¤ect of f on welfare is greater in the exi-
ble contract than in hybrid rigid contract. Given this boundary, proposition 4 of
the A&S paper, that the lower the renegotiation costs (the higher f), the more
e¢ cient the exible contract relative to the hybrid model (i.e. d(W
H W f )
df
< 0);
is reinforced under conditions of undertrusting.
The actual size of the commitment not to renegotiate matters in both propo-
sitions (3) and (4). This is once more the result of the existence of the direct
e¤ect that both parameters  and f have on welfare, but in an opposite man-
ner. As far as proposition (4) is concerned, the higher  is (the higher the
commitment not to renegotiate) the more similar the hybrid model becomes
to the pure rigid one. All other things being equal, the higher f is (the lower
renegotiation costs are), the more advantageous the exible contract is. This
result is the same as the A&S proposition (4). On the other hand, the lower 
is (the higher the probability to renegotiate), then the hybrid model becomes
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increasingly similar to the exible one. Hence the exible contract loses some
of its advantage in terms of low renegotiation costs, but gains an advantage in
terms of low asset specicity terms, as it further strengthens the argument that
a exible contract is to be preferred if sunk costs are low, as proposition (3)
indicates.
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